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The need for Social Security Reform in the next years is hardly a matter of debate. 
Therefore, the widespread believe among Americans that Social Security will not be able 
to pay benefits in the long run at the level that was anticipated, does not come as a 
surprise. The government acknowledges the situation, and predicts that substantial 
benefits cuts will be necessary, yet no legislation has been passed to tackle the problem. 
Researchers, however, have rarely modeled the uncertainty over Social Security reform 
and benefit levels, and how they affect claiming behavior and retirement. The purpose of 
this paper is to assess the extent to which these perceptions of future cuts might explain 
the puzzle of earlier take-up despite bigger penalties to doing so in the presence of 
increasing longevity. By introducing a small amount of uncertainty (based on self-
reported responses to questions regarding expectations over future cuts) of a relatively 
small cut (compared with what the government reports as necessary to solve the crisis) in 
a dynamic life-cycle model of retirement, we are able to match the claiming behavior 
observed in the data, without relying on heterogeneous preferences. Our results support 
the hypothesis that expectations over future benefits are affecting current behavior.  We 
find that a mis-specified dynamic retirement model would erroneously predict that an 
increase in the NRA would delay claiming behavior and increase labor supply at older 
ages. Once the appropriate earnings test incentives are modeled, and we account for the 
probability of reforms to the system, an increase in the NRA has little effect on claiming 
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1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, Social Security Reform has been high on the radar of economic researchers and
policy makers in terms of issues of importance. In fact, the 1983 Amendments where meant to
solve the financial crisis that Social Security was headed for. For example, President Reagan,
in his statement after signing the legislation, stated “Our elderly need no longer fear that the
checks they depend on will be stopped or reduced. These amendments protect them. Americans
of middle age need no longer worry whether their career-long investment will pay-off. These
amendments guarantee it.” Within a decade of those words, it became clear that further reforms
will be necessary to maintain the long-run balance of the system, given the evolution of the trust
fund, and the trends in claiming behavior and labor supply of older Americans. Policy evaluation
researchers failed to accurately predict the responses to this increase in the retirement age, sug-
gesting the models used for analysis were misspecified, and ambiguous theoretical responses to
such incentives were not properly analyzed, and what might have been considered large nominal
cuts to benefits at the time were in fact much smaller in real terms, especially given the large
delays embedded in the implementation of the legislation.
This situation has resulted in the widespread believe that Social Security will not be able to
pay benefits in the long run at the level that was anticipated.1 The government acknowledges
the situation, and predicts that substantial benefits cuts will be necessary, yet no legislation has
been passed to tackle the problem.2 It should not be surprising, therefore, that in the meantime,
1 Public pensions are a major income source for older Americans. Under the Old Age and Survivor Insurance
(OASI) system, the Social Security program that pays benefits to eligible workers (and their survivors) who claim
their benefits, 40 million individuals received about $435.4 billion in benefits in 2005. In that same year around 159
million individuals had earnings covered by Social Security and paid payroll taxes. Under the current system, the
early retirement age is 62, and the NRA will gradually increase from the current 65 years and eight months to 67 for
cohorts born between 1942 and 1960 and thereafter.
2 The government states that “Under the current system, today’s 30-year-old worker will face a 27% benefit cut
when he or she reaches normal retirement age.” In http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/social-security/ Strengthen-
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the average American approaching retirement age believes (as reported in several waves of the
Health and Retirement Study) that there is a 60% chance that in the next 10 years Social Security
benefits will be reduced.
Researchers, however, have rarely modeled the uncertainty over Social Security reform and
benefit levels, and how they affect claiming behavior and retirement.3 A large literature during
the 1980s and 1990s focused on explaining the connection between retirement incentives and
retirement behavior, and quite convincingly concluded that the retirement peaks at age 62 and
age 65 could be explained if the full set of incentives were included in the model. However, in
the data used in those studies the majority of Americans were claiming benefits at age 65, while
in the 1980s and 1990s the peak started to move towards age 62. By the end of the 1990s, almost
60% of older Americans were claiming benefits at age 62, and it has stayed at that level, even
with the implementation of the 1983 Amendments that penalize early claiming of benefits and
the substantial increase in expected longevity since the 1970s. In fact, as of August, 2006, 70.5%
of men and 75.5% of women claimed Social Security benefits before the Normal Retirement
Age (NRA), compared to 36% and 59% in 1970, respectively.4 Clearly, the economic incentives
seem to be insufficient to achieve the objective of prolonging average work lives, given the strong
correlation between claiming behavior and labor supply.
ing Social Security for Future Generations, Feb, 2005—background and presidential action. In SSA’s website similar
statements are made. Even influential independent policy makers like Alan Greenspan in front of the Committee of
the Budget of the U.S. House of Representatives stated that “Under current law, and even with the so-called normal
retirement age for Social Security slated to move up to 67 over the next two decades, the ratio of the number of years
that the typical worker will spend in retirement to the number of years he or she works will rise in the long term. A
critical step forward would be to adjust the system so that this ratio stabilizes.”
3 One important exception is the work of Bütler (1999), who presents a fifteen periods Overlapping Generations
model that analyzes the effects of expected and unexpected reforms, and also Phelan (1999), who discusses more
realistic characterizations of that model. One important difference between that work and ours, is that we want to
analyze the behavioral effects at the individual level, of reform expectations that do not necessarily materialize in
the short to medium run.
4 See the Social Security Bulletin, OASDI Monthly Statistics, 1970 - 2006.
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The purpose of this paper is to assess the extent to which these perceptions of future cuts
might explain the puzzle of earlier take-up despite bigger penalties to doing so. If further cuts are
anticipated, then individuals may be weighing in early certain benefit amounts against expected
reductions in the amount should they postpone retirement.
We show that one of the keys to appropriately modeling the complex incentive structure of
the US Old Age Benefits system is to account for the Earnings Test that directly impact claiming
and labor supply between the Early Retirement Age (ERA) and the NRA. Most researchers, have
only focused on the taxation aspects of the Earnings Test (ET) provisions, and have not properly
modeled the actuarial fairness of the system. Even the most sophisticated dynamic models of
retirement have failed to explain the large proportion of Americans claiming early retirement,
without making difficult to test and justify assumptions regarding preferences for early retirement.
We find that by accounting for the full set of incentives of the ET we get closer to matching the
take-up rate in the data. These latter results are in line with the findings of Benı́tez-Silva and
Heiland (2006b). However, our main contribution is the addition of reforms expectations, which
we modeled as uncertainty over benefit levels if benefit take-up is delayed. By introducing a small
amount of uncertainty (based on self-reported responses to questions regarding expectations over
future cuts) of a relatively small cut (compared with what the government reports as necessary to
solve the crisis) we are able to match the claiming behavior observed in the data, without relying
on heterogeneous preferences.5 Our results support the hypothesis that expectations over future
5 Gustman and Steinmeier (2002b) use a dynamic life cycle model that varies rate of time preference across
individuals and their predictions come closer to actual than others have found. They measure rate of time preference
using accumulated assets (savings)—under the strong assumption that those with higher rates would have saved less.
They use this model to simulate an increase in the earliest age of take-up by 2 years and show that the bunching
moves to 64—which would be predictable regardless given eligibility rules will restrict the behavior in that way.
Those who save less may have higher rates of time preference that drives their otherwise irrational desire to retire
earlier. In this case there is little policy can do to prolong work other than mandates of no benefits prior to some age
as simulated in that model. Clearly there would be a welfare loss associated with such a (likely regressive) policy. If
it is the case that policies with more information can influence behavior in desired directions without such welfare
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benefits are affecting current behavior.
Any analysis of the effects of Social Security reforms should be performed within a model
that can explain early take-up behavior, and does it by first focusing on accounting for the full
incentive structure. We find that a misspecified dynamic retirement model would erroneously pre-
dict that an increase in the NRA would delay claiming behavior and increase labor supply at older
ages (see Gustman and Steinmeier 1985, for an early discussion of the possible consequences of
the 1983 reforms). This kind of rationale seemed to have motivated (and still continues to mo-
tivate, rather surprisingly given the inadequate results of previous similar reforms) advocates of
reforms to the SSA system, which hoped to obtain additional financial relief to the Social Security
system from the taxes obtained through the increase in the work lives of later claimers.
Once the appropriate ET incentives are modeled, and we account for the probability of re-
forms to the system, an increase in the NRA has little effect on claiming behavior, and it can even
increase the proportion of individuals claiming before the NRA. This suggests that any policy that
does not affect the ratio between the benefits received at different ages (for example, any further
increases in the NRA, which are nothing but benefits cuts affecting all claiming ages equally)
should not be expected to have much impact on claiming behavior, and therefore relatively little
is to be expected in terms of labor supply responses.
Section 2 provides additional background on retirement incentives and claiming behavior.
Section 3 discusses Social Security reform expectations. Section 4 describes the dynamic struc-
tural model we use to analyze the impact of uncertainty over Social Security reform, and the
consequences of changes in the NRA. Section 5 presents the results of the simulations of the
losses, those policies would be preferred. Notice that given the well known lack of non-parametric identification of
dynamic structural models (See Rust 1994, Taber 2000, and Magnac and Thesmar 2002), the reliance on preference
heterogeneity to explain behavior is less desirable than being able to account for it through the appropriate incentives,
or even empirically grounded homogeneous beliefs about future events affecting economic constraints.
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model, and discusses the policy implications of our findings. Section 6 concludes with a short
discussion of policy alternatives.
2 The Old Age Benefits Incentive System
Social Security provides fairly complex incentives that affect the labor supply and benefit uptake
behavior of individuals between the early retirement age and the maximum retirement age. These
incentives are especially involved between the early and normal retirement ages, and we analyze
them in detail in the Appendix. Two of the most important incentives are the Social Security
Earnings Test, which determines the maximum level of earnings that do not result in a benefit
reduction for individuals who have claimed retirement benefits before the NRA, and the Actuarial
Reduction Factor (ARF), which determines the permanent reduction in benefits that individuals
face if they claim benefits early. However, the role of the Earnings Test in the context of the
adjustment of the ARF is not very well understood, or even known.
Although researchers have occasionally documented these fairly complex incentives, they
have paid relatively little attention to the possible consequences of these provisions for labor sup-
ply and claiming behavior of early retirees.6 The existing research has primarily focused on the
taxation aspects of the Earnings Test.7 Since the removal of the Earnings Test in the year 2000 for
those above the NRA, there has been relatively little discussion of the Earnings Test for younger
retirees, despite the fact that the arguments used against the former Earnings Test also apply to
this case. In fact, the incentives provided by the Earnings Test for early retirees have remained
6 Gustman and Steinmeier (1991), Myers (1993, p. 52), and Gruber and Orszag (1999, 2000) discuss this
mechanism in some detail.
7 See Vroman (1985), Burtless and Moffitt (1985), Honig and Reimers (1989), Leonesio (1990), Reimers and
Honig (1993), Reimers and Honig (1996), Friedberg (1998), Baker and Benjamin (1999), Friedberg (2000), and
Votruba (2003).
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essentially unchanged in the last three decades, but with a larger fraction of Americans retiring
early, these incentives have become increasingly important. The literature has not analyzed the
implications for labor supply and claiming behavior, of the possibility to affect the Actuarial Re-
duction Factor by working after claiming benefits and earning above the Earnings Test limit. We
will show through our dynamic model that the appropriate modeling of these incentives is key in
order to understand the claiming behavior of Older Americans.
Table 1, using data from Table 6.A4 of SSA’s Statistical Supplement, presents a snapshot of
not only an increase in early take-up since the 1970s, but how prevalent take-up at the earliest age
of 62 has become. The peaks are at the eligibility ages of 62 and 65 which, comes as no surprise
given this well established response to program incentives. Between 1999 and 2005, almost 60%
of claimants have been taking their benefits at age 62. Roughly 20% wait for the normal age of
retirement. A majority of the remaining 20% retire between ages 62 and 65. Notice the rather
anomalous claiming behavior in 2000, which resulted in an increase in claiming at age 65, and
a reduction of the proportion of individuals claiming at 62. This is entirely driven by the large
increase in new entitlements in that year, possibly the product of the removal of the Earnings Test
for those above the NRA.
Table 2, also using data from the Statistical Supplement, shows recent trends in benefits re-
ceived, in dollars of 2005, as a function of the age at which benefits where claimed. We see a
clear break in the patterns after 2000. In 1999 and 2000 it can be observed that later claiming
lead to consistently larger benefits, while since then the maximum benefit is systematically ob-
tained by those claiming at 65, but it drops for those claiming after that, maybe because those
individuals are now of a type trying to catch up to compensate for a low wage career, or a sketchy
one. It is likely that the removal of the ET for those above the NRA had the effect of allowing
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people to claim benefits independently of their labor supply behavior, leading relatively well-off
individuals, who before waited to claim to avoid the ET, to claim sooner. Notice that the sched-
uled increases in the NRA are essentially bringing back the old ET for those above age 65, so the
prediction is that a pre-ET-reform benefit level distribution is likely to emerge in the next years.
3 Social Security Reform Expectations
What the public debates on the need for Social Security Reform have certainly accomplished
is to incorporate uncertainty over future Social Security benefit amounts, despite the increasing
amount of information being provided regarding ones benefit amounts under current rules (Mas-
trobuoni, 2006). While it is true that individuals are better informed now than ever about how
much they should expect to get under current rules given the start of regular mailings containing
that information, people expect that these benefits are subject to change. And they know the
direction of the change, one way or another benefits will be cut.
If further cuts are anticipated, then individuals may be weighing in early certain benefit
amounts against expected reductions in the full amount should they postpone retirement. At
the margin, we would expect people to continue to retire earlier despite cuts, if they expect the
gain to waiting it out to be declining and possibly approaching zero.
To illustrate the mechanism we believe is at play regarding Social Security reform expecta-
tions, imagine two individuals with identical Primary Insurance Amounts (PIAs). One of them
expects to receive a given amount upon retirement at age 65 with certainty, while the other be-
lieves that there is a reasonable probability (could be quite small) of the benefit amount to decline
for retirement at age 65 by the time he reaches that age. The incentives to hold out for the full
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benefit amount, at the margin, are higher for the person who believes the payoff is a certain
amount. So if individuals believe there is some risk associated with holding out, they might opt
out earlier. This would mean that policies to cut benefits and reduce dependency ratios are not
realizing desired effects, unless they are perceived as completely solving the financial crisis of
the system, otherwise concerns over solvency are likely to continue.
Other plausible explanations for the trends toward earlier claiming of benefits, include in-
creased longevity but worsened functional capacity for work (health as a taste shifter toward
leisure), and an increased demand for leisure over time that offsets the higher price of leisure so
that empirically it appears to be a Giffen good. Other studies have taken these approaches and,
we incorporate these incentives in our dynamic model of retirement benefit take-up, as will be
clear from the next section.
In terms of the numbers actually used to reflect the probability of a drop in benefits, we use the
ten year panel available through the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), and examine responses
to questions regarding expectations over future benefits between the years of 1992 and 2002.
The responses reveal perceptions of a 60% probability, on average, of benefits becoming less
generous within the next 10 years from individuals who began the survey at the pre-retirement
eligibility ages of 51 to 61. The cumulative probability of that happening in a period of 10 years
implies a 4.825% expectation of a drop in the next year. The HRS asked questions regarding the
propensity for Social Security to make benefits less generous on a scale of 1 to 10. In the later
years the question was altered slightly to add a time frame—some time in the next 10 years. This
did not significantly alter the results. Given the magnitude of these responses, uncertainty over
future benefits is warranted in our models of benefit take-up.
In terms of the size of the benefit cut people believe could occur, if we were to follow the
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recent report by the Trustees of the SSA, in order to maintain solvency in the long-run the cuts
should be of around 13% of benefits in real terms. Individuals are likely responding to a more
modest cut, predicting that the necessary burden will likely spread across cohorts. We assume
individuals believe a permanent cut of 5.75% of benefits could occur, which is roughly equiv-
alent to about a one year loss in benefits for the average person, which might be a reasonable
expectation for the average person.8
4 The Dynamic Model
The model used in this paper is closely related to those presented in Rust and Phelan (1997),
and Benı́tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003 and 2006). Rust and Phelan (1997) did not model
consumption and savings decisions, but did estimate the parameters of the model, using a Nested
Fixed-Point algorithm, instead of calibrating them. Benı́tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003 and
2006) present the most closely related models, which are calibrated to match aggregate data and
household level data from the Health and Retirement Study, and model the Social Security Dis-
ability Insurance decisions on top of the OASI incentives. Unlike the structural model developed
in the present paper, these earlier models (or any other structural models we are aware of) do not
explicitly accounted for the possibility of affecting the Actuarial Reduction, or the possibility of
expecting a possible benefit cut in the future. Our model also shares a number of characteristics
with the work of French (2005), van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005), and Blau (2004) among
other researchers who solve, simulate, and in some cases estimate, dynamic retirement models
under uncertainty.
8 The qualitative results we will present in the next sections are robust to the assumptions regarding probability
of the drop, and the size of the drop. Quantitatively, however, they are robust as long as higher drops are expected
with slightly smaller probabilities, and vice-versa.
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We assume that individuals live a maximum of 100 years, and face mortality probabilities
similar to those in the population. They start their working lives at age 21, and maximize the ex-
pected discounted stream of future utility, where the per period utility function u
 
c  l  h  t  depends
on consumption c, leisure l, health status h, and age t. We specify a utility function for which
more consumption is better than less, with agents expressing a moderate level of risk aversion.
The flip side of utility of leisure is the disutility of work. We assume that the utility (disutility of
work) is an increasing function of age, is higher for individuals who are in worse health than indi-
viduals who are in good health, and is lower for individuals with higher human capital measured
by the average wage. In addition, we assume that the worse an individual’s health is, the lower
their overall level of utility is, holding everything else constant. Moreover, we assume that indi-
viduals obtain utility from bequeathing wealth to heirs after they die. This model assumes that
individuals are forward looking, and discount future periods at a constant rate β, assumed here
to be equal to 0.96. The model also allows for a variety of sources of uncertainty, like lifetime
uncertainty, health uncertainty, wage uncertainty, and more importantly, Social Security benefits
level uncertainty.
We will see in the next section that the latter is essential to match the large peak of benefits
claiming at age 62. Notice, however, that within the model, this uncertainty is never realized,
and benefits are never cut, but the existence of a small probability of the event happening affects
behavior, and results in claiming benefits earlier, consistently with the empirical evidence.
Any person who is not already receiving Social Security Old Age benefits is eligible to apply
for OASI benefits.9 Individuals with at least 40 quarters of earnings covered for OASI before
9 We are abstracting from Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), a program that allows workers with
severe disabilities to receive Social Security benefits before the NRA. This program currently covers about 7 million
Americans. See Benı́tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003 and 2006) for a life-cycle model of retirement and SSDI
application.
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reaching their 62nd birthday are eligible to apply and benefit award is guaranteed. In the present
version of the model we allow decisions to be made on an annual basis and assume no lag between
application date and date of first receipt.
Calculation of benefits and the reduction factors are as explained in the Appendix on incen-
tives for early retirement, assuming a NRA of 66. In particular the number of checks received in
a year depends on the earnings after claiming: the number of checks (or the benefit amount on
some checks received towards the end of the period) are reduced reflecting the 50% rate on labor
incomes exceeding the Earnings Test limit between 62 and the January of the year a person turns
66 (33% thereafter). In other words, adjustments to benefits and ARFs occurs in accordance with
the earnings and the Earnings Test limit, and we do not consider the possibility that beneficiaries
ask Social Security for a reduction of benefits or return benefits received. Even though we set up
an annual decision-making process, the Social Security Earnings Test is enforced semiannually,
i.e. the benefits received by a beneficiary are adjusted, after reaching the NRA, for the earnings
in excess of the Earnings Test limit, as long as six months or more, of benefits were withheld
in the years between the early and normal retirement ages. The structure and the details of the
model are described below.
4.1 Model Details
We solve the dynamic life-cycle model by backward induction, and by discretizing the space
for the continuous state variables.10 The terminal age is 100 and the age when individuals are
assumed to enter the labor force is 21. Prior to their 62nd birthday, agents in our model make a
leisure and consumption decision in each period. At 62 and until age 70, individuals decide on
10 See Rust (1996), and Judd (1998) for a survey of numerical methods in economics.
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leisure, consumption, and application for OASI benefits, denoted  lt  ct  ssdt  , at the beginning of
each period, where lt denotes leisure, ct denotes consumption, which is treated as a continuous
decision variable, and ssdt denotes the individual’s Social Security bene f it claiming decisions.
After age 70 is assumed that all individuals have claimed benefits, and again only consump-
tion and leisure choices are possible. Leisure time is normalized to 1, where lt  1 is defined as
not working at all, lt  543 corresponds to full time work, and lt  817 denotes part-time work.
These quantities correspond to the amount of waking time spent non-working, assuming that a
full-time job requires 2000 hours per year a part-time job requires 800 hours per year. We assume
two possible values for ssdt . If ssdt equals 1 the agent has initiated the receipt of benefits. If the
individual has not filed for benefits or is not eligible then ssdt is equal to 0.
If benefits are claimed before the NRA the monthly benefit amount is calculated similar to
equation (9). For a NRA of 66 years the reduction factor if claimed at 62 is 75%, 80.0% if
claimed at 63, 86.67% if claimed at 63, and 93.33% if claimed at 65. Due to the Earnings Test,
benefit initiation between the ERA and the NRA does not necessarily imply benefit receipt, nor is
the reduction in the benefit rate necessarily permanent after the NRA as a result of the adjustment
of the ARFs as discussed in the Appendix (see equation (10)). In particular, we use an annual
Earnings Test limit of $12,480 between 62 and 65 and $33,240 between 65 and 66 (these numbers
reflect the 2006 limits). In the former period benefits are reduced at a rate of $1 per $2 of earnings
above the limit and $1 per $3 of earnings above the limit for the latter period. These are the correct
rules for someone who turns 66 in December. Since those whose birthday is earlier in the year
face the higher limit and lower tax rate for less than a year (January to month of birthday) we have
also simulated two alternative versions, one with the $12,480 limit throughout, and another using
$20,760, the midpoint between the two limits and a tax rate of 50%. The results of these models
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do not differ markedly from those presented in the paper and are available from the authors upon
request. Those claiming after 66 earn the delayed retirement credit. We model it following the
rates faced by the 1943-1954 cohorts, of 2/3 of 1% for each month not claimed between age 66
and 70.
We also incorporate a detailed model of taxation of other income, including the progressive
federal income tax schedule (including the negative tax known as the EITC – Earned Income
Tax Credit), and state and local income, sales and property taxes. Individuals whose combined
income (including Social Security benefits) exceeds a given threshold must pay Federal income
taxes on a portion of their Social Security benefits. We incorporate these rules in our model as
well as the 15.75% Social Security payroll tax.
The model allows for four different sources of uncertainty: (a) lifetime uncertainty: modeled
to match the Life Tables of the United States with age and health specific survival probabilities;
(b) wage uncertainty: modeled to follow a log-normal distribution, function of average wages
as explained in more detail below; (c) health uncertainty: assumed to evolve in a Markovian
fashion using empirical transition probabilities from a variety of household surveys, including
the NLSY79 and the HRS. The random draws to simulate these three sources of uncertainty are
the same for all the models compared in this paper, such that the differences presented in the
results are only due to the changes in the incentive schemes.; (d) Social Security benefit level
uncertainty: this is one of the main contributions to the paper and we explain it in detail below.
Regarding the latter type of uncertainty, we first assume that agents believe there is a chance
of benefits being cut in the future. Second, at age 62 they believe that if they do not claim benefits
then there is a small probability of those benefits being smaller in the future. These beliefs are
never realized in the simulations of the model, but are present in the expectations of the agents,
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resulting in possible changes in behavior. As explained in the previous section, we use reasonable
parameter values based on aggregate data and household surveys.
The state of an individual at any point during the life cycle can be summarized by five state
variables: (i) Current age t; (ii) net (tangible) wealth wt ; (iii) the individual’s Social Security
benefit claiming state sst; (iv) the individual’s health status, and (v) the individual’s average wage,
awt .11 For computational simplicity, we assume that decisions are made annually rather than
monthly, but we allow for the benefit adjustments due to earnings above the Earnings Test limit
to happen semi-annually. This means that although individuals can only decide to claim benefits
at the time they turn 62, 63, etc. their Social Security state can be updated every year, depending
in their labor earnings, to reflect that their benefits will be adjusted for benefits withheld for
periods of six months, or one year. Since the adjustment in benefits becomes effective only after
they reach the NRA individuals still receive benefits at the original claiming rate in the period
between the time of withholding of benefits until the NRA, consistent with current rules.
The sst variable can assume up to fourteen mutually exclusive values between 62 and
66: sst  0 (not entitled to benefits), sst  62 (entitled to OASI benefits at the ERA), and
sst  62  5  63  63n  63  5  64  64n  	
  65  5  66  66n represents the remaining 12 Social Security
states corresponding to the level of benefits individuals will receive when they reach the NRA.
For individuals who decide to claim after the NRA, sst can take four additional values, age 67 to
70, since everyone is assumed to claim no later than age 70. We created an additional (implicit
state) variable, ssnt , which can assume up to five mutually exclusive values: ssnt  0 (all benefits
11 This translates into a problem with over half a million states in which to solve the model (80 periods, 15
discretized wealth states, 8 discretized average wage states, 3 health states, and 18 Social Security states). We are
able to solve this model and simulate it 10,000 times in under 20 minutes in a Dual-Processor Linux Machine with
3.6GHz Xeon Processors using Gauss, and exploiting its capability to link dynamic libraries written in C by the
authors and some of their co-authors. These C libraries perform over 95% of the computations involved in solving
and simulating these models. The code used for these simulations is available upon request, and will eventually be
available on the web.
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received, i.e. no benefits withheld), ssnt  1 (representing an original claim at age 62 of some-
one who had some benefits withheld; this applies, for example, to individuals with a sst equal to
62  5, 63n, or 64n), ssnt  2 (representing an original claim at age 63 for someone who had some
benefits withheld), ssnt  3 (representing an original claim at age 64 for someone who had some
benefits withheld), etc. With this structure we are able to separate, for example, whether someone
is a 63 claimer, denoted by sst  63, or is really a 62 claimer who has accumulated one year of
withheld benefits, represented here by sst  63n. These two individuals will receive the same
amount of benefits after the NRA, but their benefit would differ before the NRA, as explained in
the Appendix, and in additional detail in Benı́tez-Silva and Heiland (2006a, and 2006b).
In addition to age, wealth, health, Social Security status, Benefit Adjustment status, and cur-
rent income, the average indexed wage is a key variable in the dynamic model, serving two roles:
(1) it acts as a measure of permanent income that serves as a convenient sufficient statistic for
capturing serial correlation and predicting the evolution of annual wage earnings; and (2) it is key
to accurately model the rules governing payment of the Social Security benefits. An individual’s
highest 35 years of earnings are averaged and the resulting Average Indexed Earnings (AIE) is
denoted as awt .12 The PIA is the potential Social Security benefit rate for retiring at the NRA. It
is a piece-wise linear, concave function of awt , whose value is denoted by pia
 
awt  .
In principle, one needs to keep as state variables the entire past earnings history. To avoid this,
we follow Benı́tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2006) and approximate the evolution of average
wages in a Markovian fashion, i.e., period t  1 average wage, awt  1, is predicted using only
age, t, current average wage, awt , and current period earnings, yt . Within a log-normal regression
12 If there is less than 35 years of earnings when the person first becomes eligible for OASI, then the 5 lowest
years of earnings are dropped and the remaining wages are averaged. Social Security usually reports the monthly
equivalent or AIME.
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awt  1   γ1  γ2 log   yt  γ3 log   awt  γ4t  γ5t2  εt  (1)
The R2 for this type of regression is very high, with an extremely small estimated standard error,
resulting from the low variability of the  awt  sequences. This is a key aspect of the model given
the important computational simplification that allows us to accurately model the Social Security
rules in our DP model with minimal number of state variables.
We then use the observed sequence of average wages as regressors to estimate the following
log-normal regression model of an individual’s annual earnings:
log
 
yt  1   α1  α2 log   awt  α3t  α4t2  ηt  (2)
This equation describes the evolution of earnings for full-time employment. Part-time workers
are assumed to earn a pro-rata share of the full-time earnings level (i.e., part-time earnings are
0  8  800  2000 of the full-time wage level given in equation (2)). The factor of 0  8 incorporates the
assumption that the rate of pay working part-time is 80% of the full-time rate. Using the history
of earnings from the restricted HRS data set we obtained very high R2 using this methodology.
The advantage of using awt instead of the actual Average Indexed Earnings is that awt be-
comes a sufficient statistic for the person’s earnings history. Thus we need only keep track of
awt , and update it recursively using the latest earnings according to (1), rather than having to
keep track of the entire earnings history in order to determine the 35 highest earnings years,
which the AIE requires.
For the 1943-1954 cohort the NRA is 66 and the PIA is permanently reduced after the NRA






ad jm  , where k is the number of years prior
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to the NRA but after the ERA that the individual first starts receiving OASI benefits and ad jm
corrects for periods where no benefits were received due to earnings above the Earnings test
limit. Before the NRA, benefits are reduced by an actuarial reduction factor of exp
 
g1k  . In the
absence of adjustments to the ARFs, the actuarial reduction rate for the 1943 to 1954 cohort is
g1  0713, which results in a reduced benefit of 75% of the PIA for an individual who first starts
receiving OASI benefits at age 62 in the absence of any adjustments of the ARFs. In the policy
simulations that increase the NRA to 67, the reduced benefit at age 62 is 70% of the PIA.
To increase the incentives to delay retirement, the 1983 Social Security reforms gradually
increased the NRA from 65 to 67 and increased the delayed retirement credit (DRC). This is
a permanent increase in the PIA by a factor of exp  g2l  , where l denotes the number of years
after the NRA that the individual delays receiving OASI benefits. The rate g2 is being gradually
increased over time. The relevant value for the 1943 to 1954 cohort is g2  0  0769, which
corresponds to an increase in 8% in benefits per year of delay after the NRA. The maximum
value of l is MRA

NRA, where MRA denotes a “maximum retirement age” (currently 70),
beyond which further delays in retirement yield no further increases in PIA. As noted above, it
is not optimal to delay applying for OASI benefits beyond the MRA, because due to mortality,
further delays generally reduce the present value of OASI benefits the person will collect over
their remaining lifetime.
We assume that the individual’s utility is given by
ut
 
c  l  h  age   cγ  1γ  φ   age  h  aw  log   l   2h  (3)
where h denotes the health status and φ
 
age  h  aw  is a weight that can be interpreted as the
relative disutility of work. We use the same specification for φ and the disutility from working
as in Benı́tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2006). The disutility of work increases with age, and
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is uniformly higher the worse one’s health is. If an individual is in good health, the disutility of
work increases much more gradually with age compared to the poor health, or disabled health,
states. The disutility of work decreases with average wage. We postulate that high wage workers,
especially highly educated professionals, have better working conditions than most lower wage
blue collar workers, whose jobs are more likely to involve less pleasant, more repetitive, working
conditions and a higher level of physical labor. Figure 1 plots the function φ that we used in the
solution and simulations of the life-cycle model.
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Figure 1: Relative Weight on Leisure as a Function of Age, Health and Average Wage
We assume that there are no time or financial costs involved in applying for OASI benefits.
The parameter γ indexes the individual’s level of risk aversion. As γ  0 the utility of con-
sumption approaches log
 
c  . We use γ    37, which corresponds to a moderate degree of risk




w  aw  ss  h  denote the individual’s value function, the expected present discounted
value of utility from age t onward for an individual with current wealth w, average wage aw, in
Social Security state ss and health state h. We solved the DP problem via numerical computation




w  aw  ss  h   max
0  c  w
l  54  81  1 
ssd  At  ss 
Vt
 
w  aw  ss  c  l  ssd  h   where (4)
Vt
 
w  aw  ss  c  l  ssd  h   ut   c  l  h  β ! 1  dt   h #" EVt  1   w  aw  ss  c  l  ssd  h   dt   h  EB   w  aw  ss  c  l  ssd  h   (5)
where At
 
ss  denotes the set of feasible Social Security choices for a person of age t in Social
Security state ss and dt
 
h  denotes the age and health-specific mortality rate, B   w  is the bequest
function, and EB denotes its conditional expectation. We have used the HRS and AHEAD data
to estimate age and health-specific death rates, but since there is little data on individuals over
80 years old we make parametric smoothness assumptions on the dt
 
h  function (basically a
logit functional form that is polynomial in t and has dummy variables for the various health
states h) and subject the estimates to the further restriction that for each t the expected hazard
over h should equal the unconditional age-specific death rates given in the 1997 edition of the
U.S. Decennial life tables.13 The function EVt  1 denotes the conditional expectation of next
period’s value function, given the individual’s current state
 
w  aw  ss  h  and decision   c  l  ssd  .
Specifically, we have
EVt  1   w  aw  ss  c  l  ssd  h   $
y % 2∑h %'& 0 17∑ss %& 0Vt  1   wpt   w  aw  y () ss  ssd   awpt   aw  y (
  ss (
* ft   y (,+ aw  kt   h (-+ h  gt   ss (-+ aw  w  ss  ssd  dy (  (6)
where awpt
 
aw  y  is the Markovian updating rule that approximates Social Security’s exact
formula for updating an individual’s average wage, and wpt summarizes the law of motion for
13 De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006) find that more sophisticated mortality characterizations do not seem to
significantly improve the fit of a related dynamic structural model which focuses on post-retirement saving behavior.
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next period’s wealth, that is,
wpt
 
w  aw  y  ss  ssd   R . w  ssbt   aw  y () ss  ssd  y (  τ   y () w   c /0 (7)
where R is the return on saving, and τ
 
y  w  is the tax function, which includes income taxes
such as Federal income taxes and Social Security taxes and potentially other types of state/local
income and property/wealth taxes. The awpt function, derived from (1), is given by
awpt
 
aw  y   exp 1 γ1  γ2 log   y  γ3 log   aw  γ4t  γ5t2  σ2  2 23 (8)
where σ is the estimated standard error in the regression (1). Note there is a potential “Jensen’s
inequality” problem here due to the fact that we have substituted the conditional expectation of
wt  1 into the next period value function Vt  1 over wt  1 and awt  1 jointly. However, as noted
above, the R2 for the regression of awt  1 on awt is virtually 1 with an extremely small estimated
standard error σ̂. In this case there is virtually no error resulting from substituting what is an
essentially deterministic mapping determining awt  1 from wt  1 and awt .
Above, ft
 
y + aw  is a log-normal distribution of current earnings, given current age t and
average wealth aw, that is implied by (2) under the additional assumption of normality of errors
ηt . The discrete conditional probability distributions gt
 
ss ( + aw  w  ss  ssd  and kt   h ( + h  reflect the
transition probabilities in the Social Security and health states, respectively.
Finally, to account for the Social Security reform expectations, we introduce in the opti-
mization process the possibility that with a probability of 4.825%, the agents faced a modified
equation (4), with a modified equation (6) and modified law of motion for wealth, which embeds
a permanent drop in benefits of 5.75%.
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5 Simulation Results and Policy Experiments
Table 3 reports the results for three different models of Social Security, assuming a NRA of 66.
Model 1 treats the earnings test as a pure tax on earnings above the corresponding ET limit, which
is how it may be perceived by a proportion of the general public given difficulty in understanding
complex adjustment factors for working beyond take-up (Benı́tez-Silva and Heiland, 2006a and
2006b), and how a majority of researchers have modeled these incentives. Using this framework,
our model of optimal behavior predicts that only about 35% of claimers would take up at age
62, with a much smaller peak at 65 at roughly 18%, with a bulk of the remaining beneficiaries
claiming at the ages in between. Benefits, given this behavior, increase slightly with age at all
points so that there are economic incentives for delaying take-up.
With the implementation of the proper Earnings Test incentives, which allow for the modi-
fication of the actuarial reduction factor through work after take-up with earnings above the ET
limit, Model 2 shows a trend towards earlier claiming of benefits. This moves us closer to the
actual take-up rates with a jump from only 35% claiming at 62 in Model 1 to over 48% in Model
2. The actual current take-up rate is around 56.6% (SSA Statistical Supplement, 2006). There
continues to be a second smaller peak at age 65 with 23% of the sample holding out for the un-
penalized NRA benefit. Only 4% of the sample hold off until after 65 for taking up when the
penalty for working after take-up is reduced compared to 11% in Model 1.
While the biggest jump toward actual behavior comes from adding to the model the possi-
bility to affect the adjustment factors, introducing, on top of Model 2, Social Security benefit
uncertainty (Model 3) comes very close to predicting actual behavior. The predicted take-up in
this framework where people perceive a potential risk to delaying take-up goes up to 59%, com-
pared to the 57% actual take up rates at this age. The peak at age 65 falls to 21% compared to
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predictions from Model 2 (which predicts 23% take-up), and this again is closer to the actual rate
of 19%. More people are willing to take lower benefits earlier, knowing they can move closer to
the full benefit with the ARF adjustments, and preferring the actuarial reduction with certainty
over future uncertain cuts.
The comparison between Models 2 and 3 provides a sense of the effects of reducing uncer-
tainty over reforms. We can see that Model 2 predicts more full-time work, especially at age
62, but also in later ages, due to the strong connection between claiming behavior and labor sup-
ply These results are broadly consistent with the findings of Bütler’s (1999), who indicates that
uncertainty considerations are important, and that governments can reduce the amount of uncer-
tainty agents have to deal with, resulting in welfare improving allocations, by providing better
information regarding the timing and the type of reforms in store.
One of the advantages of dynamic models is that it allows us to perform a welfare analysis.
We have computed compensating variations, which capture the willingness to pay, or in this case
the need to be compensated, for having to face the uncertainty over Social Security reforms. We
find that given that the uncertainties are never realized, the differences in welfare are very small,
and affect only a small proportion of individuals. Only about 5% of individuals in our simulations
see a drop in their welfare, and among those the drops in welfare account for less than 1.5% of
their average wealth in the simulations. This suggests that eventhough the changes in behavior
resulting from this source of uncertainty are clearly non trivial, many of the individuals forced to
claim earlier were originally close to indifferent with respect to claiming at other ages.
The last column in the three panels of Table 3 shows the benefit levels predicted by the
model. Notice how close they are to the actual benefits received by Older Americans, which we
reported in Table 2. This comes to show how accurate our model is in matching qualitatively,
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and quantitatively, even in dollar terms, actual data. Given that we are using a NRA of 66, and
therefore individuals face the Earnings Test between age 65 and 66, the relationship between
benefits levels at different ages is closer to that present in the period before the elimination of the
ET for those above the NRA. This translates in the prediction that later claimers obtain higher
benefits.
In this paper we focus on claiming behavior and labor supply, but the model also simulates
the evolution of wealth, consumption, and wages over the life cycle. As shown in Benı́tez-Silva,
Buchinksy, and Rust (2006), in a closely related model, the predictions of the model are consistent
with the HRS data.
Table 4 simulates behavioral responses to increasing the NRA to 67. We resolve and re-
simulate the same three models with this modification. Under the policy of an earnings test as a
pure tax, increasing the normal age to 67 yields the implicit and desired effects of the policy—
delaying take-up, and likely retirement. With the original NRA of 66, more than half of the
beneficiaries claim by age 63. When the NRA increases about half of the beneficiaries are claim-
ing at ages 65 and 66. From the last column we see they have to work more to earn the same
benefits. This is a pure benefit cut and the responses that are predicted are not what we observe
in the data.
Adding in the appropriate ET rules leads us to conclude that with a more realistic set of
incentives, the predictions move significantly closer to the real outcomes. With the higher NRA,
the take up rate at 62 increases holding the rest of the features of Model 2 constant. There is no
longer a peak at 65 nor is there one at 67. The next peak is at age 66. It is not until we move
to Model 3, where we allow for uncertainties over future benefit guarantees, that do we get that
second peak back at age 65, as in the actual data. Again, increasing the NRA only moves people
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toward earlier claiming of retirement benefits in these last two models and we see little action in
terms of desired behavioral consequences.
These findings support the sound economic intuition that any policy that does not affect the
ratio between the benefits received at different ages (for example, any further increases in the
NRA, which are nothing but benefits cuts affecting all claiming ages equally) should not be ex-
pected to have much impact on claiming behavior, and therefore relatively little is to be expected
in terms of labor supply responses, except maybe some increases in order to compensate for the
loss of benefits.
It is clear from these results that only a model that accounts for the appropriate incentive
scheme and that is able to match the claiming behavior of individuals, can be reliably used as
a policy instrument. The predictions of a simplistic and misspecified model are erroneous and
misleading. Unfortunately, many previous and current policy makers seem to gain their intuitions
from such a faulty framework, with the consequence of defending changes to the system which
have few real meaningful effects.
6 Conclusions
We use a dynamic life cycle framework to model the majority of the complexities of the Old Age
Social Security program, as well as expectations of future benefit cuts to predict benefit claiming
behavior. The attention to detail in terms of the incentives, and the modeling of the very plausible
expectation of future cuts, pays off in terms of predictive power in terms of claiming behavior of
Older Americans. The latter have been extremely elusive in previous models using recent data.
We then use the expanded model to show that the increases in NRA, which are currently being
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implemented, and the possible further increases being debated, do very little to change a properly
modeled incentive structure, suggesting the lack of efficacy of pure benefit cuts to promote lasting
changes in behavior.
On the other hand, expectations about future benefits seem to have a big impact, and given
the reality of the Social Security burden, there is little policy can do to alter those expectations.
There have to be cuts in some way. Mandating a set of cuts, with some serious commitment to
fix the program for more than a couple of decades, so that there are no expectations of benefits
cuts again, should delay take-up and alleviate, at least in part, the financial crisis. The necessary
cuts for this plan to succeed would impose undue burden on a generation that would result in
severe welfare losses. The challenge can be understood in the context of the work of Auerback
and Hasset (2006), who discuss sticky policies. Unfortunately when it comes to Social Security,
policies are not sticky enough so that there is little confidence in future benefit amounts among
planners.
From a policy perspective our results suggest a complex environment where intuitions based
on simple models can lead to large miscalculations. No policy reform will be simple, and even
simplifications of the system, like the elimination of the Earnings Test, would not necessarily
solve too many problems, as shown in Benı́tez-Silva and Heiland (2006b).14
14 French (2005), using his estimates from a dynamic structural model, performs the experiment of removing the
earnings test for those between age 65 and 70. He finds large effects in terms of the hours worked after age 65, and
also in terms of the number of years in the labor force, even if the average hours worked by workers are largely
unchanged. Although these are results in a partial equilibrium setting, they indicate that a possible removal of the
Earnings Test for those between the ERA and the NRA would have significant effects on the labor supply of older
Americans. Gruber and Orszag (2000), using the CPS and taking a more descriptive approach, find little evidence of
the effects of the Earnings Test on the labor supply of men, but some evidence of effects on benefit claiming behavior.
Song (2004) using the SIPP finds that the removal of the ET leads to uneven effects over the earnings distribution,
with large effects on the earnings of high earners. The author also finds an increase in claiming for the 65 to 69
age group. More recently, Song and Manchester (2006) using SSA’s Continuous Work History Sample reach similar
conclusions. Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) find that the removal of the Earnings Test worsens (especially in the
short run) the cash flow problems of Social Security due to greater incidence of early benefit claiming. Their analysis
does not, however, account for potential administrative cost savings.
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The increase in the early retirement age would have a mechanical effect, but is likely to be
highly regressive. It is possible that in order to obtain financial relief beyond that of benefits cuts,
through labor supply increases, it is necessary to device an actuarially unfair incentive structure
in which late claiming is better compensated. The later would be made hoping that the actual
labor supply responses, and the resulting tax revenues, compensate for the cost of such a policy,
which although regressive might be less so than just increasing the ERA.
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Appendix: Social Security Incentives for Early Retirement
Individuals who claim benefits before the NRA but continue to work or reenter the labor force
can reduce the early retirement penalty by suspending benefit payments.15 The Actuarial Reduc-
tion Factor (or early retirement reduction factor), in turn, will be increased proportionally to the
number of months without benefits, which will increase benefits permanently after the individual
reaches the NRA.16 This adjustment of the ARF allows those who become beneficiaries before
the NRA to partially or completely reverse the financial consequences of their decision, avert-
ing being locked-in at the reduced rate. In the sequel of this section the exact details of these
incentives are presented.
Benefit Calculation
Individuals aged 62 or older who had earned income that was subject to the Social Security
payroll tax for at least 10 years since 1951 are eligible for retirement benefits under the Old Age
benefits program. Earnings are subject to the tax up to an income maximum that is updated
annually according to increases in the average wage.17 To determine the monthly benefit amount
(MBA), the Social Security Administration calculates the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) of a
worker as a concave piece-wise linear function of the worker’s average earnings subject to Social
Security taxes taken over her 35 years of highest earnings. If the benefits are claimed at the NRA
(66 for those born between 1943 and 1954, and currently at 65 and 8 months), the MBA equals
the PIA. If an individual decides to begin receiving benefits before the NRA and exits the labor
force or stays below the earnings limit, her MBA is reduced by up to 25%, assuming a NRA of
66. Under the current regulation of the OA program, the monthly benefit amount received upon






0  75  0  05 8 112 8   Months not claimed in the period prior to 3 years before NRA 98 PIA
if claimed more than 3 years before NRA; 
0  80  0  20 8 136 8   Months not claimed in 3 years before NRA  *PIA
if claimed within the 3 years before NRA 
where MBAt represents the monthly benefit amount before the NRA (see SSA-S 2005, p.18).
Assuming that the individual continues to receive benefits, her MBAt is permanently reduced.
The Actuarial Reduction Factor (ARF) underlying this calculation is a permanent reduction of
15 In this paper, we are not considering spousal benefits and joint decision making in the household. The complex-
ities introduced by those considerations are out of the scope of this analysis. See Gustman and Steinmeier (1991),
Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten (2002), and Votruba (2003) for a discussion. By ignoring spousal benefits
we are not taking into account the fact that approximately 5.96% of the individuals who receive some type of Old
Age, Survivors, or Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefits receive them as spouses of entitled retirees. This percent-
age comes from the Public-Use Microdata File provided by the Social Security Administration and refers to a 1%
random sample of all beneficiaries as of December of 2001.
16 Given a NRA of 66, which will be the prevailing one for the cohort born between 1943 and 1954, the Actuarial
Reduction Factor is a number between 0.75 and 1 depending on when the individual claims benefits, and how many
months he or she earns above the Earnings Test after claiming benefits.
17 Six percent of the 153 million workers with Social Security taxable earnings in 2002 had earnings at or above
the maximum amount.
27
benefits by 5/9 of 1 percent per month for each month in which benefits are received in the three
years immediately prior to the NRA. The reduction of benefits is 5/12 of 1 percent for every
month before that. Thus, the maximum actuarial reduction will reach 30 percent as the NRA
increases to 67 over the next few years (see SSA-S 2005, p.18).18
Actuarial Reduction Factor
One less-emphasized feature of the process of benefit reduction due to early retirement is the
possibility to reduce the penalty even after initiating the receipt of benefits. The specifics of this
adjustment to the Actuarial Reduction Factor are documented in the Social Security Handbook
(SSA-H, §724. Basic reduction formulas, §728. Adjustment of reduction factor at FRA) and in
the internal operating manual used by Social Security field employees when processing claims
for Social Security benefits (SSA-M, RS00615. Computation of Monthly Benefits Amounts) but
may not be well-understood by the retirees.19 To illustrate this feature of the system, suppose
the NRA is 66 years, and an individual claims benefits at age 62 and n months, where n :;: 48,
receives checks for x months where
 
n  x :;: 48  , and suspends receiving checks after that until
she turns 66 (after which she retires for good). In this case she receives x checks of
(10)
MBAt =<   0  75  0  05 8 112 8 n >8 PIA if claimed more than 3 years before NRA;  0  80  0  20 8 136 8 n >8 PIA if claimed within the 3 years before NRA 
After turning 66, her MBA will be permanently increased to
MBAt  ! 0  75    0  20 8 136 8 n    0  20 8 136 8   36  n  x  0  05 "?8 PIA  (11)
It is important to note that the adjustment of the ARF is automatic and becomes effective only
after reaching the NRA.
Earnings Test
The Earnings Test limit defines the maximum amount of income from work that a beneficiary
who claims benefits before the NRA under OASI may earn while still receiving the “full” MBA.20
18 The reductions in benefits for early claimers are designed to be approximately actuarially fair for the average
individual. During the post-NRA period additional adjustments exist: Workers claiming benefits after the NRA earn
the delayed retirement credit (DRC). For those born in 1943 or later it is 2/3 of 1 percent for each month up to age 70
which is considered actuarially fair. For those born before 1943 it ranges from 11/24 to 5/8 of 1 percent per month,
depending on their birth year.
19 The Social Security Administration does not use the term Actuarial Reduction Factor in their publications, but a
number of the people we have talked to within the administration do use this terminology. In publications the related
concept of “Reduction Factor(s)” (RF) which is simply the number of months in which benefits were received before
the NRA is used. The RF maps into a “Fraction” that ranges between 0.75 and 1 (for an ERA of 62 and an NRA
of 66). The latter corresponds to what we refer to as ARF. The ARF (“Fraction”) is adjusted upwards at the NRA
according to the number of months before the NRA in which benefits were withheld.
20 Some sources of income do not count under the Earnings Test. For details see SSA-H §1812. Notice that
retirement contributions by the employer do not count towards the limit, but additional contributions by the employee
even if they are through a payroll deduction are counted. This means that individuals earning above the limit cannot
just increase their retirement savings to avoid being subject to the limit. We thank Barbara Lingg and Christine
Vance from the Social Security Administration for clarifying this point, which is rarely discussed in any publication.
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Earnings above the limit are taxed at a rate of 50 percent for beneficiaries between age 62 and
the January of the year in which they reach the NRA, and 33 percent from January of that year
until the month they reach the NRA (SSA-S 2005, p.19; SSA-S 2005, Table 2.A18). For the
latter period, the earnings limit is higher, $31,800, compared with $12,000 for the earlier period
as of 2005 (SSA-S 2005, Table 2.A29). Starting in 2000, the Earnings Test was eliminated for
individuals over the NRA.
Individuals who continue or reenter employment after claiming Social Security benefits be-
fore the NRA, and whose earning power or hours constraints are such that their income from
work is around or below the earnings limit, are mailed their full monthly check from Social
Security and are locked-in at the reduced benefit rate permanently. Those with earnings above
the limit will not receive checks from Social Security for some months and thereby adjust their
ARF.21 Individuals have the option of informing Social Security to suspend the monthly benefit
payment at any time if they believe they will be making earnings high enough above the Earnings
Test. However, during the first year after claiming benefits, the Social Security Administration
performs a monthly test to determine whether the person should receive the monthly check. As a
result an early claimer who is not working or earns below the limit in the months after claiming
(“grace year”) will receive all monthly benefits even if earnings for that calendar year exceed the
Earnings Test limit due to high earnings before claiming.22 After the first year, the test is typically
yearly and it depends on the expected earnings of the individual. Given the scarce documentation
of the functioning of the ARF, having earned above the earnings limit, and thus receiving fewer
checks, may be a common way for beneficiaries to learn about the possibility of undoing the early
retirement penalty.23
21 A beneficiary may receive a partial monthly benefit at the end of the tax year if there are excess earnings that
do not completely offset the monthly benefit amount (see SSA-H, §1806).
22 Social Security claim specialists emphasized to us that during the first year after claiming they do what is
most advantageous to the claimer, the monthly or the yearly test, if they have enough information. However, they
failed to clarify what that means. Some of them said the number of checks individuals receive is maximized, but
we were unable to find documentation of such practices. In any case, the internal operating instructions used by
Social Security field employees when processing claims for Social Security benefits state that the monthly earnings
test only applies for the calendar year when benefits are initiated unless the type of benefit changes (see SSA-M,
RS02501.030).
23 See Benı́tez-Silva and Heiland (2006b) for a numeric example of the streams of income resulting from these
incentives.
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Table 1: Social Security Claiming Behavior, 1999-2005. Proportions by age of first receipt.
Age/Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Age 62 0.585814 0.517198 0.553939 0.560256 0.569939 0.575377 0.566377
Age 63 0.079887 0.067144 0.077954 0.077716 0.078255 0.081044 0.083014
Age 64 0.107773 0.104554 0.134435 0.148463 0 .127389 0.109411 0.099255
Age 65 0.155732 0.195975 0.178526 0.172416 0.178465 0.186224 0.197471
Age 66 0.019467 0.039229 0.013024 0.009695 0.010518 0.012259 0.014628
Age 67-69 0.029166 0.055034 0.019949 0.015288 0.016098 0.017789 0.018782
Age 70+ 0.022161 0.020865 0.022173 0.016166 0.019366 0.017896 0.020474
Total 1,484,600 1,758,900 1,574,000 1,595,530 1,593,271 1,680,339 1,793,537
Table 2: Social Security beneficiaries’ monthly benefits by age, 1999-2005. In $ of 2005.
Age/Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Age 62 855.64 864.56 884.42 892.58 900.40 888.31 881.90
Age 63 928.79 960.51 973.08 1,002.77 1,006.43 996.66 986.90
Age 64 987.87 1,020.39 1,072.88 1,119.80 1,119.68 1,102.01 1,089.80
Age 65 1,100.29 1,184.50 1,176.10 1,239.22 1,257.03 1,270.85 1,298.30
Age 66 1,093.73 1,247.67 939.56 881.73 919.08 981.26 1,052.20
Age 67 1,128.66 1,285.78 911.44 873.48 877.89 933.59 1,010.40
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Table 3: Simulation Results: 10,000 Simulations of the Dynamic Model
Ages Survivors Full-Timea Part-Timea No Worka Claimersb Benefits in $
Model 1: Earnings Test as a Tax
Age 60 8,234 5,749 (69.8%) 163 (5.7%) 2,322 (28.8%) — —
Age 61 8,078 5,635 (69.7%) 213 (2.6%) 2,230 (27.6%) — —
Age 62 7,951 4,714 (59.2%) 2 (0.02%) 3,235 (40.6%) 2,672 (34.9%) 1,042
Age 63 7,762 2,013 (25.9%) 856 (11.0%) 4,893 (63.0%) 1,331 (17.4%) 1,151
Age 64 7,586 495 (6.5%) 2,008 (26.4%) 5,083 (67.0%) 1,048 (13.7%) 1,272
Age 65 7,420 113 (1.5%) 2,731 (36.8%) 4,576 (61.6%) 1,362 (17.8%) 1,391
Age 66 7,239 414 (5.7%) 3,484 (48.1%) 3,341 (46.1%) 847 (11.0%) 1,500
Model 2: Earnings Test with ARF Adjustments
Age 60 8,234 5,749 (69.8%) 154 (1.8%) 2,331 (28.3%) — —
Age 61 8,078 5,636 (69.7%) 214 (2.6%) 2,228 (27.5%) — —
Age 62 7,951 4,058 (51.0%) 0 3,893 (49.0%) 3,741 (48.3%) 981
Age 63 7,762 1,657 (21.3%) 1,387 (17.8%) 4,718 (60.7%) 1,073 (13.8%) 1,155
Age 64 7,586 434 (5.7%) 2,413 (31.8%) 4,739 (62.5%) 815 (10.5%) 1,277
Age 65 7,420 175 (2.4%) 3,139 (42.3%) 4,106 (55.3%) 1,808 (23.3%) 1,390
Age 66 7,239 553 (7.6%) 4,179 (57.7%) 2,507 (34.6%) 306 (4.1%) 1,480
Model 3: ET with ARF Adjustments and Social Security Reform Uncertainty
Age 60 8,234 5,768 (70.05%) 118 (1.43%) 2,348 (28.5%) — —
Age 61 8,078 5,636 (69.8%) 177 (2.2%) 2,265 (28.04%) — —
Age 62 7,951 3,377 (42.5%) 0 (0.00%) 4,574 (57.5%) 4,603 (59.08%) 997
Age 63 7,762 1,540 (19.9%) 2,000 (25.8%) 4,222 (54.4%) 813 (10.4%) 1,180
Age 64 7,586 394 (5.2%) 2,802 (36.93%) 4,390 (57.9%) 689 (8.8%) 1,275
Age 65 7,420 181 (2.4%) 3,511 (47.3%) 3,728 (50.2%) 1,659 (21.3%) 1,390
Age 66 7,239 594 (8.2%) 4,351 (60.1%) 2,294 (31.2%) 27 (0.4%) 1,514
Notes: aIn numbers, and as percentage of survivors. bNumber of First Claimers at that age, and as percentage of the total who ever claimed.
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Table 4: Policy Experiment: NRA is changed to 67. 10,000 Simulations of the Dynamic
Model
Ages Survivors Full-Timea Part-Timea No Worka Claimersb Benefits in $
Model 1: Earnings Test as a Tax, and NRA=67
Age 60 8,234 5,771 (70.1%) 117 (1.4%) 2,346 (28.5%) — —
Age 61 8,078 5,640 (69.8%) 166 (2.1%) 2,272 (28.1%) — —
Age 62 7,951 5,530 (69.5%) 0 2,423 (30.5%) 1,872 (24.8%) 989
Age 63 7,762 4,237 (54.6%) 194 (2.5%) 3,331 (42.9%) 446 (5.9%) 1,110
Age 64 7,586 1,744 (22.9%) 514 (6.7%) 5,328 (70.2%) 1,040 (13.78%) 1,212
Age 65 7,420 1,124 (15.1%) 0 6,298 (84.8%) 1,884 (24.9%) 1,234
Age 66 7,239 848 (11.7%) 0 6,393 (88.3%) 1,862 (24.6%) 1,392
Age 67 7,041 1,078 (15.3%) 0 5,968 (84.7%) 412 (5.46%) 1,457
Model 2: Earnings Test with ARF Adjustments, and NRA=67
Age 60 8,234 5,773 (70.1%) 123 (1.5%) 2,338 (28.4%) — —
Age 61 8,078 5,636 (69.7%) 173 (2.1%) 2,269 (28.1%) — —
Age 62 7,951 4,150 (52.1%) 3 (0.03%) 3,798 (47.8%) 4,016 (51.96%) 886
Age 63 7,762 2,173 (27.99%) 1,409 (18.1%) 4,180 (53.85%) 996 (12.88%) 1,049
Age 64 7,586 839 (11.1%) 2,400 (31.6%) 4,347 (57.3%) 605 (7.8%) 1,182
Age 65 7,420 309 (4.16%) 3,024 (40.7%) 4,087 (55.1%) 738 (9.55%) 1,259
Age 66 7,239 158 (2.2%) 3,670 (50.69%) 3,411 (47.1%) 1,302 (16.84%) 1,397
Age 67 7,041 466 (6.6%) 4,314 (61.3%) 2,261 (32.1%) 71 (0.91%) 1,516
Model 3: ET with ARF Adjustments, Social Security Reform Uncertainty, and NRA=67
Age 60 8,234 5,765 (70.01%) 118 (1.43%) 2,347 (28.5%) — —
Age 61 8,078 5,634 (69.75%) 177 (2.2%) 2,267 (28.06%) — —
Age 62 7,951 3,371 (42.4%) 0 (0.00%) 4,578 (57.57%) 5,084 (65.16%) 1,060
Age 63 7,762 2,016 (25.97%) 2,000 (25.8%) 3,597 (46.3%) 714 (9.15%) 1,073
Age 64 7,586 769 (10.1%) 2,802 (36.93%) 3,883 (51.1%) 512 (6.56%) 1,191
Age 65 7,420 316 (4.2%) 3,511 (47.3%) 3,552 (47.9%) 927 (11.9%) 1,281
Age 66 7,239 158 (2.2%) 4,392 (60.6%) 2,736 (37.8%) 561 (7.2%) 1,398
Age 67 7,041 499 (7.1%) 4,392 (60.6%) 2,217 (31.5%) 4 (0.05%) 1,523
Notes: aIn numbers, and as percentage of survivors. bNumber of First Claimers at that age, and as percentage of the total who ever claimed.
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